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Reconceptualising Homelessness Legislation in England 
 





This article has two central aims. First, it problematises the long-held consensus that 
homelessness legislation in England operates according to the concept of need and, secondly, 
it advances an alternative reading and reconceptualisation of homelessness legislation 
according to the notion of risk. Through examination of the two major sources of current 
homelessness law, the Housing Act 1996 and the recently-enacted Homelessness Reduction 
Act 2017, this article locates and explores how risk is operationalised, the precise conceptions 
of risk engaged and the implications and potentiality of this risk reconceptualisation. In so 
doing, it is argued that risk exhibits a stronger explanatory power of the current homelessness 
legislation than need and presents opportunities for how we understand local authority 













'Society has come to understand itself and its problems in terms of the principles of the 
technologies of risk.'1 
 
There is a pervasive and long-standing consensus in government, amongst politicians and 
policy-makers that housing in England2 is allocated to the homeless according to an ideology 
of need; in other words, that those most ‘in need’ of housing are those who receive it. Yet, as 
Cowan et al have observed, this widely-acknowledged rationale of need, whilst almost 
universally promulgated,3 is conceptually empty and has largely gone unchallenged.4 This 
 
1 F. Ewald ‘Norms, Discipline, and the Law’ 30 Law and the Order of Culture, 138, 147. 
2 Homelessness is a devolved issue in the UK. This article is limited to coverage of the issue of 
need and risk as they operate in homelessness legislation in England. 
3 Chiefly in political and academic circles: see D. Cowan., R. Gilroy., C. Pantazis, ‘Risking 
Housing Need’ (1999) 26(4) Journal of Law & Society 403. As to the need consensus across 
political divides, see: M. Carter and N. Ginsburg, ‘New government housing policies’ (1994) 
41 Critical Social Policy 100; I. Loveland, ‘Cathy sod off! The end of the homelessness 
legislation’ (1994) 16 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 367.  
4 There are two principal exceptions to this: Cowan et al have called for rethinking of housing 
law according to a concept of risk, n 2 above. Fitzpatrick & Stephens have, separately, sought 
to apply a utility maximising framework to housing allocations, recommending housing be 
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article takes up that task in critiquing and challenging the status of need as the central 
ordering principle in homeless provision and advances a reconceptualisation, a re-reading of 
homelessness legislation according to the ordering theme of risk. It does so, not through an 
examination of housing policy, but through an exposition of the two major pieces of 
legislation governing homelessness law in England today: the Housing Act 1996 and the 
recently-enacted Homelessness Reduction Act 2017. The article proceeds in four parts. A first 
part briefly problematises the concept of housing need and, in so doing, exposes the concept 
of need as contested, indeterminate and flawed. A second part introduces the alternative, 
ordering theme of risk by unpacking our understanding and definition of the word risk and 
highlighting the prevalence of risk analyses across social sciences literature. A third part 
explores how the Housing Act 1996 and the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 can be 
reconceptualised as risk-based systems and how risk provides a framework for understanding 
our homelessness law. This involves locating the operationalization of risk within the 
legislation, the precise conceptions of risk engaged and reflecting on how risk exhibits a 
stronger and more productive explanatory power of how homelessness legislation functions 
in practice than the concept of need.  
 
In a final section, this article examines the implications of the risk-based framework 
advocated and reflects on the wider ramifications of a risk reconceptualisation. The argument 
advanced is not that need has no role or value whatsoever in homelessness provision but 
 
allocated according to those in ‘greatest long-term housing deprivation,’ on which see: S. 
Fitzpatrick., M. Stephens, ‘Homelessness, Need and Desert in the Allocation of Council 
Housing’ 14(4) Housing Studies 413. 
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rather that a reconceptualisation according to risk as an alternative (but not substitutive) 
rationale offers novel insights into the workings of the legislation and unlocks possibilities for 
future reform. Risk as an analytical frame is therefore proposed not in order to eradicate the 
ideology of need nor to suggest that need is entirely redundant but as a novel way of ‘seeing’ 
and reading the legislation. In so doing, this article identifies two contrasting conceptions of 
risk operating in our law: first, a negative, exclusionary notion of risk employed as a technique 
of gate-keeping and resource rationing including ‘modes of power’ which can be understood 
as situated within the wider social control literature,5 and, secondly, a positive, inclusionary 
and more holistic conception of risk which seeks to mitigate the predicted, future harms of 
homelessness. It is contended that risk in this second, positive and inclusive conception can 
be a progressive and positive tool to shape future reform. To this end, the case is made for 
reframing homelessness law according to a ‘risk-embracing’ rather than a ‘risk-averse’ 
conception as a vehicle for delivering more dynamic and person-centred homelessness 
legislation. 
 
PROBLEMATISING THE CONCEPT OF NEED IN HOMELESSNESS LEGISLATION 
 
 
5 On social control see generally: J. Chriss, Social Control: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007); H. Dean, Social Security and Social Control (London: Routledge, 1991). 
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The concept of need has long played a significant role in the provision, distribution as well as 
in the academic theorising and critique of housing entitlement in England6 yet little searching 
examination of the concept has been afforded as it operates in homelessness legislation.7 As 
Cowan et al have observed: 
 
 ‘It has almost been a mantra in housing circles that social housing is allocated 
according to ‘need’ … it has been regarded as an absolute given, indeed a necessity, in 
housing welfare terms and one accepted across political divides.’8 
 
In this section, the concept of need is problematised and exposed as contested, 
indeterminate and conceptually hollow thus challenging the apparent settled status of the 
ideology of need as the foundation of current homelessness legislation.9 
 
6 See J. Bradshaw, ‘A taxonomy of social need’, in G. Maclachlan (ed.), Problems and progress 
in medical care (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). 
7 There are 3 key exceptions to this: Cowan et al, n 3 above, consider risk in housing law 
context chiefly in relation to duties owed to sex offenders; Fitzpatrick & Stephens, n 3 above; 
see also Perri 6 ‘Housing Policy in the Risk Archipelago: Toward Anticipatory and Holistic 
Government’ (1998) 13(3) Housing Studies 347. 
8 Cowan et al, n 3 above, at 402. 
9 See consensus on the Housing Act 1996 as critiqued by D. Cowan, ‘Reforming the 
homelessness legislation’ (1998) 18 Critical Social Policy 435; M. Carter and N. Ginsburg, ‘New 
government housing policies’ (1994) 41 Critical Social Policy 100; I. Loveland, ‘Cathy sod off! 
The end of the homelessness legislation’ (1994) 16 J. of Social Welfare and Family Law 367.  
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As Spicker has explored, to assert a need is to assert a claim to receive a service.10 In the 
homelessness context, need thus refers to a claim to be rehoused or to receive housing 
support. The concept imports a connotation of necessity; and a rhetorically attractive sense 
that citizens’ reasonable (housing) expectations will be met. As Spicker neatly captures, ‘the 
political pressure for equity [in housing allocation] creates a demand for consistency, which 
in turn creates an emphasis on the notion of apparent objective, measurable need.’11 Need 
as the basis for entitlement to housing for the homeless has its origins in the development of 
the welfare state in Britain and, in particular since the 1970s, has taken centre stage as the 
uneasy welfare consensus that emerged in the post-war period dissolved and the universalist 
approach to welfare gave way to a growing safety-net approach to entitlement. This is well-
illustrated by the enactment of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 197712 which heralded 
the first recognizable, ostensibly needs-based framework for housing. The 1977 Act, for the 
first time, made local authorities responsible for accommodating particular groups of 
homeless people and offered the first statutory definition of homelessness in English law. The 
Act, introduced through a Private Members’ Bill and joining the statute book only after 
 
10 P. Spicker, ‘Needs as claims’ (1993) 27(1) Social Policy and Administration 7. 
11 P. Spicker, ‘Concepts of need in housing allocation,’ (1987) 15(1) Policy and Politics, 17, at 
25. 
12  For a critique of the 1977 Act, see amongst others R. De Friend, ‘The Housing (Homeless 
Persons) Act 1977’ (1978) 41(2) Modern Law Review, 173-183; J. N. J. Crowson, ‘Revisiting the 
1977 Housing (Homeless Persons) Act: Westminster, Whitehall and the Homelessness Lobby’ 
(2013) 24 Twentieth Century British History, 424-447. 
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extensive and complex negotiations between government and local authorities, reflected the 
growing importance and role of the terminology of need as the route to housing entitlement 
through introduction of the ‘priority need’ categories. Only those individuals who could 
demonstrate a ‘priority need’ would receive housing: need was therefore expressly on the 
face of the legislation.13 The passage of the Housing Act 1996 (which remains the key source 
of our homelessness law today and which retained the basic framework of the 1977 Act) 
further confirmed the broad political agreement that existed on legislating according to need. 
A government review in 1989 had underscored that homelessness legislation be targeted at 
‘people with a genuine urgent requirement for housing, who would expect to receive a high 
priority in any needs-based system of housing allocation,’14 and affirmed, in a subsequent 
review in 1994, that reform was required to ensure accommodation was allocated according 
to ‘genuine need’ and ‘real housing needs.’15 Today, reference to and reliance on the language 
of need as the supposed ideological foundation of our law remains cemented in the policy 
discourse; demonstrating the continuing rhetorical potency of the rationale of need. The 
Government’s 2018 Green Paper, A New Deal for Social Housing stated, for example, that, 
 
13 The ‘priority need’ categories might, alternatively, be construed not as need-based but a 
means of distinguishing the ‘deserving’ homeless from those ‘undeserving.’  
14 Department of the Environment, The Government's Review of the Homelessness Legislation 
(London: Department of the Environment, 1989). 
15 Department of the Environment, Access to Local Authority and Housing Association 
Tenancies (London: Department of the Environment, 1994), at [2.4], [3.1]. 
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‘providing homes based on individual’s needs,’16 was the central principle guiding reforms to 
the sector. This was mirrored in Shelter’s 2019 report A Vision for Social Housing which draws 
heavily on notions such as housing for ‘people in the most need’17 and highlighting the 
‘national picture of housing need.’18 
 
Yet despite the development of elaborate theoretical analyses to delimit the concept of need 
across academic disciplines from medicine to education to adult social care (perhaps most 
famously in Bradshaw’s ‘taxonomy of social need’ in the 1970s),19 need has long been a 
contested and problematic notion; most notably for its indeterminate meaning and the 
political malleability and manipulability that the language of need provides. Significant 
criticism has come from varied quarters: as to the inability to classify the concept with any 
meaningful precision;20 that the concept is so void of substance as to be impossible to 
 
16 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, A New Deal for Social Housing 
(2018) (CM9671), 5. 
17 Shelter, Building for our future: a vision for social housing (2019), 15. 
18 ibid at 37. 
19 See in particular: J. Bradshaw, ‘A taxonomy of social need.’ in McLachlan G (ed.) Problems 
and progress in medical care (NPHT/Open University Press, 1972); G. Smith, Social need: 
policy, practice and research (London: RKP, 1980); S. Baldwin,  Needs assessment and 
community care: clinical practice and policy making (Butterworth-Heinemann: Oxford, 
1998).L. W. Green & M. W. Kreuter, Health promotion planning: an educational and 
environmental approach (CA: Mayfield, Mountain View, 2nd edition, 1991). 
20 S. Clayton S., ‘Social need revisited,’ (1983) 12(2) Journal of Social Policy 215. 
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measure and employ;21 and from feminist writers22 and ‘new-right’ theorists23 who regard 
need as deeply gendered and paternalistic.24 One particular difficulty, exemplified in the 
government reviews in 1989 and 1994 of homelessness legislation and an issue that endures 
today, is the assumption that need can be understood as a single, agreed, definable, objective 
‘test.’ This assumption is open to serious question. Specifically in the homelessness context, 
the representation of need as absolutist and coherent belies the complexity and multi-faceted 
nature of the homeless experience by suggesting erroneously that individuals are readily 
categorisable as either ‘in need’ or ‘not in need.’ Such binaries fail to take account of the 
diversity of homeless individuals’ housing circumstances and chime disconcertingly with 
echoes of the historical distinction drawn between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor in 
the old English Poor Laws.25 
 
21 A. A. Nevitt, ‘Demand and need’, in H. Heisler (ed.), Foundations of social administration 
(London: Macmillan, 1977) 
22 N. Fraser, ‘Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation’ in P. Lassman (ed.), 
Politics and Social Theory (London: Routledge, 1989). 
23 N. Barry, Welfare (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990). 
24 Feminist activists have long and successfully campaigned for the ‘priority need’ categories 
under current homelessness legislation to be expanded to include those who are vulnerable 
as a result of fleeing violence or threats of violence. This change was ultimately introduced 
under The Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002. 
25 See amongst others S. Hindle, ‘Civility, Honesty and the Identification of the Deserving 
Poor in Seventeenth-century England,’ in H. French H., J. Barry (eds) Identity and Agency 
in England, 1500–1800 (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2004). 
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Beyond definitional indeterminacy, need is routinely engaged (both within and without the 
legal sphere) as a tool not in fact of meeting or correcting insufficiencies, wants or demands 
(e.g. for housing), but as a framework for delivering and legitimising financial or resource 
rationing in times of public finance constriction.26 As Spicker explains, ‘the ideology [of need] 
is based less in the implementation of common [welfare] principles than the constraints of 
practice.’27 Need is deployed to manage scarce resources and to rationalise resource 
contraction; to develop ‘rationing filters’ and gatekeeping processes rather than in the 
satisfaction of genuine housing need as one might commonly understand it. As Fitzpatrick 
and Stephens highlight, housing the homeless has always been more concerned with 
gatekeeping and housing stock management rather than alleviating wants or satisfying 
need.28  
 
When housing supply is inadequate to meet the well-documented, increasing demand, it 
becomes difficult to argue that housing is, in any meaningful sense, allocated according to 
 
26 As Bramley et al note, the concept of housing need ‘ultimately rests on value and policy 
judgments … weighed against available resources: A. Holmans, Housing Demand and Need in 
England 1996-2016 (London: Town and Country Planning Association/National Housing 
Federation, 2001). 
27 P. Spicker, ‘Concepts of need in housing allocation,’ (1987) 15(1) Policy and Politics, 17 
28 See S. Fitzpatrick., M. Stephens, ‘Homelessness, Need and Desert in the Allocation of 
Council Housing’ 14(4) Housing Studies 413. 
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need.29 It is this disparity between supply and demand that led Loveland to suggest that 
homelessness legislation, ‘could plausibly be portrayed as an exercise in legislative deceit.’30 
Yet need is politically expedient for, as Cowan et al indicate, the ‘conveniently indeterminate 
meaning’31 it betrays ‘has enabled successive governments to pay lip service to welfarist 
principle whilst … providing the necessary degree of latitude to ignore whenever 
[governments] deem necessary.’32 The concept of need, while both politically convenient and 
definitionally pliable, has never offered a wholly satisfactory account of homelessness 
entitlement in England: need alone does not and never has provided an exhaustive 
explanation of the 1977 nor the 1996 homelessness legislation. Need can be seen to stretch 
and bend to meet various policy and political ends sought to be achieved and might even be 
said to carry a moralistic tone.33 In the sections that follow, an alternative reading of 
homelessness law according to risk is advocated as a more convincing, productive and stable 
basis for explaining and reconceptualising current homelessness legislation. This is not to 
 
29 See discussions of need and ‘demand’ undertaken by economists including A. Williams, 
(1974), ‘Need’ as a demand concept,’ in A. J. Culyer (ed.), Economic problems and social goals 
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1974); A. J. Culyer, Need and the National Health Service, (Oxford: 
Martin Robertson, 1976). 
30 I. Loveland, Housing Homeless Persons (London: OUP, 1995), 331 
31 Cowan et al, n 3 above, at 404. 
32 ibid. 
33 Consider media representation of asylum seekers as ‘queue jumpers’ in housing; also I. 
Loveland, ‘Cathy sod off! The end of the homelessness legislation’ (1994) 16 J. of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 367, 340. 
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argue that need plays no role whatever in the provision of housing to the homeless (quite 
plainly it does so even if merely rhetorically) but rather that the concept of risk exhibits a 
stronger explanatory power of our current legislation than need alone. As Nelken has argued, 
legislation is a ‘managed activity’34 and rarely a univocal statement of a single prevailing 
ideology. The next part therefore briefly unpacks the concept of risk before the subsequent 
sections explore how risk is operationalised in current homelessness legislation and the 
implications of this reconceptualisation. 
 
THE CONCEPT OF RISK: DEFINITION, POTENTIALITY AND PREVALENCE IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 
LITERATURE 
 
The Covid-19 pandemic has increased our collective awareness of societal risks from risks to 
health to employment precarity. Crucially, the pandemic has also shone a searching spotlight 
on how the homeless are protected, ‘governed’ and provided for under existing  
homelessness law. As the homelessness crisis in England endures and the pandemic 
stimulates society at large to revisit and reimagine how we might tackle contemporary issues 
and crises, academics are looking anew at enduring legal dilemmas and, in the homelessness 
context in particular, considering fresh ways of conceptualising and resolving long-standing 
questions about how homelessness law is framed. The call for new thinking sounds across 
disciplines from law to sociology and economics; all of which are increasingly seeking novel 
ways of seeing, interpreting and conceptualising the housing and homelessness crisis. The 
 
34 D. Nelken, ‘Is There a Crisis in Law and Legal Ideology’ (1982) 9(2) Journal of Law and Society 
Vol. 9, No. 2, 177, 184. 
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results are varied and fascinating from Marcuse and Madden,35 who urge a Marxist approach 
and, drawing on the work of Henri LeFebvre into ‘a right to the city,’ argue that housing should 
be recognised as a fundamental human right; to Fineman’s vulnerability theory.36 This article 
contributes to this wider theoretical undertaking by exploring how a framework of risk might 
be deployed to better inform and enhance our understanding of homelessness law and policy. 
 
The concept of risk is not new. What is new, as Garland has observed, is the growing 
recognition that, ‘modern societies are risk-managing societies’37 and how in recent years, 
‘the study of risk has burst out from [its] traditional, technical confines and become a major 
topic in the social sciences and in cultural commentary.’38 This is unsurprising as, ‘risk is a 
thoroughly social, thoroughly cultural, thoroughly psychological phenomenon.’39 There is 
broad agreement that risk is probabilistic: a ‘probability statement’ importing notions of 
prudence, of acting today to influence what may happen tomorrow. As Ericson and Doyle 
observe, risk is ‘a calculating concept that brokers between fear and harm and spans fact and 
 
35 P. Marcuse., D. Madden, In Defense of Housing: The Politics of Crisis (London: Verso Books, 
2016). 
36 M. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013). 
37 D. Garland ‘The Rise of Risk’ in R. V. Ericson, A. Doyle (eds.) Risk and Morality (2003, 
University of Toronto Press: Toronto), Chapter 3, 73). 
38 Ibid at 69. 
39 ibid. 
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value.’40 Landmark risk analyses have been advanced across diverse social science disciplines 
including prominent work in the 1990s by Ewald,41 Defert,42 and Castel43 in the fields of 
insurance and psychiatry. For all three, risk was presented as a ‘technology of government’, 
a means of analysing how social problems are viewed, ‘imagined’ and managed. Beck’s 
seminal thesis characterising modern society as an anxious, cataclysmic, dystopian, 
‘catastrophic risk society,’44 while open to much academic debate, underscores the 
potentiality and potency of risk analyses in the wider social science canon.45 Risk is a 
technique through which events and individuals can be sorted, ordered and managed based 
on assessment of future harms. For Giddens, an influential risk scholar, an appreciation of 
modern risk environments leads to a greater awareness of the limits of expert systems and 
 
40 R. V. Ericson, A. Doyle (eds) Risk and Morality (2003, University of Toronto Press: Toronto), 
Introduction, 13). 
41 F. Ewald ‘Norms, Discipline, and the Law’ 30 Law and the Order of Culture, 138. 
42 D. Defert, ‘“Popular Life” and Insurance Technology’ in G. Burchell; C. Gordon P. Miller (eds) 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (1991: Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press), 211. 
43 R. Castel, ‘From Dangerousness to Risk’ in G. Burchell; C. Gordon P. Miller (eds) The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (1991: Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 281. 
44 U. Beck Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1992). 
45 Beck’s vision of a catastrophic risk society sits in conflict with other risk scholars who see 
the modern, audit society as monitoring, managing, minimizing risk or as Bernstein has 
described it ‘the mastery of risk:’ P. L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of 
Risk (1996, New York: John Wiley and Sons). 
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the need to challenge professional competences46 and despite being an ‘apparently simple 
notion’, risk, ‘unlocks some of the most basic characteristics of the world in which we now 
live.’47 This article seeks to contribute to this growing literature through a re-reading and 
reconceptualisation of homelessness law according to risk. This involves locating how risk 
operates within current homelessness legislation and, crucially, pinpointing the precise 
conception of risk that it is argued is engaged.  This is the task of the next section. 
 
THE OPERATIONALISATION OF RISK IN CURRENT HOMELESSNESS LEGISLATION 
 
Legal obligations to the homeless in England are, today, contained almost exclusively in the 
Housing Act 1996 Part VII48 and in the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017. A full examination 
and rehearsal of the duties owed by local authorities to the homeless is beyond the scope of 
this article but, where appropriate, attention will be drawn to the principal obligations owed. 
Rather, this section does two things: first, it locates and explores how specific provisions of 
our homelessness law can be read as operating according to risk (and often directly counter 
to any notion of need), and secondly, it identifies the precise conception of risk engaged. 
What emerges is that risk is engaged in two contrasting ways: first, in certain statutory 
measures, according to a negative, ‘risk-averse’ and exclusionary conception, yet, in other 
statutory provisions, in what is described here as a positive, inclusionary and ‘risk-embracing’ 
conception. 
 
46 A. Giddens, ‘Risk and responsibility’ (1999) 62 MLR 1. 
47 A. Giddens, The BBC Reith Lectures 1999 Lecture 2: Risk. 
48 As amended by the Homelessness Act 2002 and Localism Act 2011. 
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(i) The Housing Act 1996 
 
The ground-breaking Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 197749 made local authorities 
responsible for the first time for the long-term housing of particular groups of homeless 
people and offered the first statutory definition of homelessness in English and Welsh law. 
The 1977 Act defined certain groups considered as having ‘priority need’ and therefore owed 
a statutory duty to be rehoused by local authorities. The homelessness duties of the 1977 Act 
were later consolidated into the Housing Act 1996 which, in key respects, maintained the 
essential framework of the 1977 Act including the definition of ‘priority need’ which the 1996 
Act clarified. Today, Part VII of the Housing 1996 Act50 as amended51 remains the key source 
of homelessness law in England and a homeless applicant will be owed the so-called ‘main 
housing duty’ if the applicant is: (i) eligible for assistance;52 (ii) in ‘priority need';53 (iii) not 
 
49 Accounts of the significance and originality of the 1977 Act are contested: N. J. Crowson, 
‘Revisiting the 1977 Housing (Homeless Persons) Act: Westminster, Whitehall, and the 
Homelessness Lobby’ (2012) 24(3) Twentieth Century British History 424. 
50 On which see generally D. Cowan (ed.) The Housing Act 1996 – A Practical Guide (Bristol: 
Jordans, 1996).  
51 The Housing Act 1996 has subsequently been amended by the Homelessness Act 2002, 
Localism Act 2011, Housing & Planning Act 2016 and the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017. 
52 Eligibility is a question of immigration status: see Housing Act 1996 ss 185, 186. 
53 Housing Act 1996 s189. 
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intentionally54 homeless;55 and (iv) can demonstrate a local connection to the local authority 
area.56 ‘Priority need’ is defined in s189 of the 1996 Act as including a pregnant woman, a 
person with dependent children, someone vulnerable as a result of old age, mental illness, 
handicap or physical disability or other special reason; those homeless or threatened with 
homelessness as a result of an emergency such as flood, fire or other disaster.57 On one view, 
the survival of the fundamental framework of the 1977 Act into the provisions of the 1996 
Act may provide evidence of the continued potency of need as the ordering theme of 
homelessness entitlement. However, whilst need continues to occupy an important role both 
in political and policy rhetoric, it is argued that this fails to engage with a key driving force of 
the legislation; namely risk. The essential framework of the 1996 Act can, it is argued, be 
understood and construed as a risk-based, risk management system. This is exemplified by 
the approach taken: (1) to the notion of intentional homelessness; (2) to how local authorities 
frame their housing allocation schemes; (3) to the requirement for an applicant to 
demonstrate a local connection and (4) to notions of ‘vulnerability’ for the purposes of the 
priority need categories. Each will be considered in turn. 
 
Risk is perhaps most clearly operationalised in the notion of ‘intentional homelessness’ in the 
1996 legislation. Intentionality was first introduced in the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 
1977 after a protracted yet ultimately successful lobbying effort from the Association of 
 
54 Housing Act 1996 s191. 
55 Housing Act 1996 s175. 
56 Housing Act 1996 s199. 
57 Housing Act 1996 s189(1). 
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Councils and Conservative MPs who wished to deter self-induced homelessness and 
discourage queue jumping for permanent rehousing.58 Intentionality survived from the 1977 
Act into the 1996 legislation and only those applicants that are not intentionally homeless will 
be owed the main housing duty. Under s191(1) of the 1996 Act, ‘a person becomes homeless 
intentionally if he deliberately does or fails to do anything in consequence of which he ceases 
to occupy accommodation which is available for his occupation and which it would have been 
reasonable for him to continue to occupy.’ The determination of intentionality is one to be 
made by the local authority59 and, it is argued here, amounts to a risk assessment; a 
determination which involves a consideration of how the homeless applicant weighed up the 
risks they faced which ultimately led to their homelessness. Put differently, the question of 
intentionality is a determination of how the homeless applicant itself assessed, balanced and 
responded to their own housing risk. Intentional homelessness cannot be explained as 
operating according to any concept of need.  
 
A wealth of case law examples exists in which applicants who adopt ‘riskier’ behaviours were 
deemed intentionally homeless.60 As the case law demonstrates, the decisive factor is an 
 
58 See R. De Friend, ‘The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977’ (1978) 41(2) Modern Law 
Review, 173, at 182. 
59 Confirmed in Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, Homelessness Code 
of Guidance for Local Authorities (2018), at [9.5]. 
60 Cowan et al, n 3 above, cite example of a R v Hounslow LBC ex parte R (1997) 29 H.L.R. 939 
where the court concluded that a convicted sex offender’s homelessness was intentional on 
the basis that the loss of accommodation was the probable result of the commission of 
 19 
assessment by the authority of the risks and, more pointedly, the ‘riskiness’ of the actions 
taken by the applicant which led to their loss of housing. In Denton v Southwark LBC,61 the 
Court of Appeal upheld the decision of a local authority that a 20 year old applicant was 
intentionally homeless after he had been excluded from his mother’s home as a result of his 
poor behaviour. The 20 year old had not heeded warnings to cease causing a nuisance and 
stop his drug use. The Court of Appeal held that the mother’s ‘house rules’ were reasonable 
and the authority was entitled to find the cause of the applicant’s homelessness was his own 
poor behaviour which amounted to a deliberate act under s191.62 The central question was 
how ‘risky’ the behaviour of the homeless applicant had been. Where the probability of risky 
behaviour occurring or re-occurring is greater than not, an applicant will be held to be 
intentionally homeless thereby slipping outside the net of homelessness entitlement and 
protection. In so doing, local authorities are, at the same time, seeking to avoid the risk to 
their own housing stock and risk to their housing management resources of housing 
individuals displaying undesirable behaviour.  
 
Intentionality construed through this framework of risk has strong echoes with historical 
distinctions of the deserving and undeserving poor. Whilst there are grounds to argue that 
intentionality was introduced as a means of rationing state resources, it is contended here 
 
further offences; on which see: J. Fionda and D. Cowan, ‘“He asked for it”: paedophiles and 
the homelessness legislation' (1998) 10 Child and Family Law Quarterly 321. 
61 Denton v Southwark LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 623; [2007] 7 WLUK 73. 
62 Alfonso Da Trindade v Hackney LBC provides another recent example of risky behaviour 
leading to a determination of intentionality. 
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that intentionality is better understood as a risk management tool; a device designed to 
restrict entitlement to housing for those engaged in risky or objectionable behaviour rather 
than founded on a needs evaluation exercise. Indeed as De Friend wrote in 1978 of the 1977 
Act in this very journal, ‘the intentions and behaviour of a homeless person rather than his 
and his family’s ‘objective’ housing needs are now the crucial determinant of the services 
which he may receive.’63  
 
Risk can also be identified as operationalised in how local authorities frame their allocation 
schemes: that is, the policies they use to determine who is selected to receive housing. In 
view of changes introduced by the Localism Act 2011,64 local authorities when framing their 
allocations schemes are permitted to specify criteria and categories of applicant who are 
regarded as non-qualifying for rehousing. Work conducted by Bevan and Cowan65 has 
revealed how anti-social behaviour and other ‘unacceptable behaviour’ (as defined by the 
authority) including a history of rent arrears are the principal non-qualifying conditions 
adopted by the majority of local authorities in England.66 This is another example of how 
‘risky’ individuals – those deemed to engage in ‘risky’ behaviours – are expressly excluded 
 
63 R. De Friend, ‘The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977’ (1978) 41(2) Modern Law Review, 
173, at 183. 
64 On which, see generally discussion of the Localism Act 2011: C. Bevan, ‘The Hollow Housing 
Law Revolution’ (2014) 77(6) MLR 964. 




from housing support. Such individuals are designated as ‘non-qualifying’, joining what Bevan 
and Cowan have described as a growing population of ‘unhouseables’. The design of housing 
allocation schemes can, therefore, be understood as a housing risk management exercise 
designed according to broader conceptions of risk. 
 
In a different context, the requirement that a homeless applicant be able to point to a local 
connection67 with the authority area to which they are applying before becoming entitled to 
the main housing duty, offers further support to the thesis that need alone cannot explain 
the 1996 legislation. The requirement for a local connection has little if anything to do with 
need but instead is characteristic of the gatekeeping inherent in homelessness law in England. 
Local connection is no more than a ‘rationing filter’ employed to reduce and strike out the 
numbers of applicants seeking housing support in a context of restrained resources and 
limited housing supply. Moreover, the power of one authority to refer a homeless applicant 
to another authority area which the applicant does enjoy such a connection can be seen as 
permitting one authority to shift responsibility for housing that homeless applicant onto 
another local authority and its housing stock.68  
 
Finally, it is argued that the ‘priority need’ categories under the 1996 Act can be understood 
as operating according to a rationale of risk. We see this reflected in the most contentious 
and disputed aspect of ‘priority need’, namely, the notion of ‘vulnerability’ that sits at the 
 
67 Housing Act 1996 s199 as amended by Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 s8. 
68 The authority to which the homeless applicant initially applied retains any interim duty to 
accommodate until the new authority accepts it owes a duty: Housing Act 1996 s199A. 
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heart of s189(1)(c) of the 1996 Act. In the absence of a statutory definition of vulnerability, it 
has been left to the courts to grapple with and make sense of the concept and it is here that 
risk is engaged. The Supreme Court in Hotak v Southward LBC,69 held that vulnerability 
involved an exercise in relativity, hence a legal comparator was necessary. The test of 
vulnerability is not, said the court, as had previously been thought, a comparison with an 
‘ordinary homeless person’70 but ‘an ordinary homeless person if made homeless.’ Lord 
Neuberger went further noting that ‘vulnerable’ connoted ‘significantly more vulnerable than 
ordinarily vulnerable’.71 The Court of Appeal in Panyiotou v Waltham Forest LBC72 confirmed 
that, ‘significantly more vulnerable’ was to be interpreted on a qualitative rather than 
quantitative basis by asking if the applicant would, if made homeless, when compared to an 
ordinary homeless person, suffer or be at risk of harm or detriment in a significant way taking 
account of the actuality and qualitative characteristics of the applicant’s situation rather than 
 
69 Hotak v Southwark LBC [2015] UKSC 30; [2016] A.C. 811 on which generally see I. Loveland 
‘Reforming the homelessness legislation? Exploring the constitutional and administrative 
legitimacy of judicial law-making,’ (2018) Public Law 299; J. Meers, ‘Murky waters: the 
ongoing evolution of vulnerability under section 189 of the Housing Act 1996’ 21(4) Journal 
of Housing Law 76. 
70 See the long-standing ‘test’ for vulnerability as laid down by the Court of Appeal in R v 
Camden ex parte Pereira [1998] 5 WLUK 359; (1999) 31 H.L.R. 317. 
71 Hotak, n 67 above, at [53] per Lord Neuberger. 
72 Panyiotou v Waltham Forest LBC [2017] EWCA Civ 1624; [2018] Q.B. 1232 on which see N. 
Madge, ‘Failing the homeless?’ (2018) 21(6) Journal of Housing Law 119. 
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looking quantitatively for ‘more harm plus.’73 A determination of ‘vulnerability’ and of priority 
need is, thus, as the Supreme Court has confirmed, a comparative exercise founded on a 
balancing of risk; a determination as to the comparative, relative risks of the impacts of 
homelessness on an applicant vis-à-vis an ordinary person if made homeless. To the extent 
that need plays any role in this exercise, it is relevant only in so far as it feeds into this broader 
assessment of risks and harms. Put differently, an applicant will be accepted as ‘vulnerable’ if 
they are deemed to be exposed to significant risk as a result of their homelessness. This 
connection between vulnerability and risk is made unambiguous in the Code of Guidance to 
which local authorities are required to have regard when making housing and homelessness 
decisions. In particular, as concerns 16 and 17 year olds, the Code notes: ‘a young person who 
is homeless without adequate financial resources to live independently may be at risk of 
abuse or exploitation [or other harm].’74 This follows earlier codes of guidance which had 
equally made express the clear link between vulnerability and risk: 
 
[A] young person on the streets without adequate financial resources to live 
independently may be at risk of abuse or prostitution. The Secretary of State considers 
that homeless 16 & 17 year olds who have no back up support are likely to be at risk 
 
73 Approach confirmed by Court of Appeal in Rother DC v Freeman-Loach [2018] EWCA Civ 
368; [2019] P.T.S.R. 61. 
74 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, Homelessness Code of Guidance 
for Local Authorities (2018), at [8.41]. 
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as a result of their age and circumstances and he would normally expect authorities 
to find that such applicants are vulnerable.75 
 
The precise conception of risk engaged in the 1996 Act differs across the distinct statutory 
measures of the legislation. In relation to intentional homelessness, the ability of authorities 
to frame allocation schemes by designating ‘non-qualifying’ groups and the requirement for 
local connection, risk is engaged as an exclusionary device. These measures are ‘risk-averse’, 
by which is meant that risk is engaged as means of resource rationing. According to this 
conception, the 1996 Act constructs risk groups or ‘risk pools’ according to defined risk 
factors. Risk here therefore operates negatively as a technique of ‘category exclusion’ in that 
those regarded as risk groups (for example, the intentionally homeless), evincing risky 
behaviours (and so non-qualifying under an allocation scheme) or lack a local connection find 
themselves excluded from homelessness entitlement. Risk is thus operationalised as a means 
of determining (non-)qualification and selection for homelessness provision on the basis of 
the risks (understood negatively) that particular individuals pose both to the management of 
social housing and local authority housing stock but also to the safety of the wider 
community. This resonates with the work conducted on risk and criminal justice by Feeley 
 
75 Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Code of Guidance for Local 
Authorities on the Allocation of Accommodation and Homelessness (Draft) (1999) at [12.15]. 
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and Simon76 and O’Malley77 who emphasise that the effect of a risk-based system is to treat 
individuals as members of defined ‘risk categories.’ Just as in the field of insurance where 
young age is used as a marker of the increased risk of an accident occurring thereby justifying 
higher insurance premiums, in the homelessness context, through intentionality and the 
framing of non-qualifying categories according to ‘risky’ behaviours we see just such ‘risk 
categories’ created which are central to determining who is entitled and who not to receive 
homelessness support. 
 
However, in relation to the notion of vulnerability for the purposes of ‘priority need,’ a quite 
distinct approach to risk can be isolated. Here, the conception of risk engaged is what might 
usefully be termed ‘risk-embracing’ rather than ‘risk-averse.’  A vulnerable person is someone 
deemed to be at significant risk of future harms, thus behoving assistance and thereby falling 
within the net of homelessness provision. Determinations of risk here are not premised on 
rationing resources or excluding certain groups from provision per se but, rather, risk is 
deployed contrastingly as a technique of ‘category inclusion.’ Risk therefore operates 
positively in relation to vulnerability and contrary to the negative operationalisation of risk 
 
76 See: M. M. Feeley., J. Simon (1992) ‘The new penology: Notes on the emerging strategy  
of corrections and its implications’ (1992) 30(4) Criminology, 449–74. 
M. M. Feeley, M.M. and J. Simon, ‘Actuarial justice: The emerging new criminal law’, in D. 
Nelkin (ed.) The future of criminology (1994, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications), 172-201. 
77 P. O’Malley, ‘Risk, power and crime prevention’ 21(3) Economy and Society, 252–75. 
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seen as regards intentionality, non-qualifying categories and local connection. We now turn 
to examine the operationalisation of risk in the HRA 17. 
 
(ii) The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 
 
The Homelessness Reduction Act 201778 passed into law on the 40th anniversary of the 
enactment of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 197779 and promised to herald a culture 
change80 in homelessness law. The 2017 Act, which like the 1977 Act began life as a Private 
Members’ Bill,81 and followed a significant review of existing homelessness law conducted by 
an independent panel of experts convened by housing charity Crisis in 2015, has been 
described as ‘the most ambitious reform in decades.’82 The 2017 Act amends Part VII of the 
Housing Act 1996 by expanding existing duties and ‘bolting on’ new legal duties on English 
local authorities so as to provide a sliding scale of assistance to those who are homeless or 
threatened with homelessness. In short, the 2017 Act requires local authorities to intervene 
at an earlier stage to prevent and relieve homelessness. There are five major changes at the 
 
78 On which see generally D. Cowan, ‘Reducing homelessness or reordering the deckchairs?’ 
(2019) 82(1) MLR 105; I. Loveland ‘Reforming the homelessness legislation? Exploring the 
constitutional and administrative legitimacy of judicial law-making,’ (2018) Public Law 299. 
79 The 2017 Act came into force on 2nd April 2018. 
80 2nd Reading of the Bill, HC Deb vol 616 col 544 28 October 2016, Bob Blackman. 
81 Private Members’ Bill of Bob Blackman Conservative MP for Harrow East; described as, ‘the 
longest and most expensive Private Member’s Bill to successfully become legislation.’ 
82 Sajid Javid, then Communities Secretary, March 2018. 
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heart of the 2017 Act. First, a renewed emphasis on providing advice to anyone threatened 
with homelessness;83 secondly, a new duty to assess all eligible applicants and work with 
them to agree a personalised ‘housing plan’;84 thirdly, a new duty on local authorities to 
intervene to prevent homelessness (the ‘prevention duty’)85 accompanied by an extended 
definition of ‘threatened with homelessness’ from 28 to 56 days;86 fourthly, a duty on local 
authorities to relieve homelessness (the ‘relief duty’);87 and fifthly, a new ‘referral duty’88 
introducing an obligation on specified public authorities to refer individuals who are homeless 
or threatened with homelessness to a local authority housing department. 
 
The various moving parts of the 2017 legislation coalesce around three connected impulses: 
(i) advice and assessment; (ii) prevention; and (iii) early intervention – all of which are 
targeted at seeking to avoid or mitigate the impacts of homelessness. The consequence of 
this, it is argued here, is that the 2017 Act can be meaningfully understood as operating 
according to a rationale of risk. The 2017 legislation operates, it is contended, not according 
to a concept of need but as a manifestly risk-based system. Risk as connoting a calculation of 
the probability of specified events taking place, a measure of future likelihood of a 
circumstance coming to pass, describes precisely the exercise undertaken under the new 
 
83 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s2 substituting Housing Act 1996 s179. 
84 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s3 inserting new Housing Act 1996 s189A. 
85 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s4 substituting Housing Act 1996 s195. 
86 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s1 amending Housing Act 1996 s175. 
87 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s5 inserting new Housing Act 1996 s185B. 
88 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s10 inserting new Housing Act 1996 s213B. 
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2017 Act’s provisions which are designed to catch and defuse as early as possible the risks of 
homelessness. This process begins, under the 2017 legislation, with the duty on local 
authorities to undertake an assessment of all eligible applicants who are homeless or 
threatened with homelessness and agree a housing plan.89 This determination is, in essence, 
a risk assessment or risk audit under which the local authority must identify present and 
future housing risks and threats including assessing the risk of future housing deprivation 
potentially leading to an applicant’s homelessness. The authority must then, together with 
the applicant, devise a plan containing ‘reasonable steps’ that the authority and the applicant 
must take to secure stable accommodation and commit this to writing.90 This personalised 
assessment and planning duty can again be conceptualised as risk-orientated; focused on 
locating, isolating and eschewing homelessness risks rather than meeting an applicant’s wider 
housing need. 
 
Equally, the 2017 Act’s newly-broadened definition of ‘threatened with homelessness’ and 
the prevention duty under which local authorities are required to take, ‘reasonable steps to 
help the applicant secure that accommodation does not cease to be available for the 
applicant’s occupation,’91 can be construed as operating according to an organising theme of 
risk. Under s1 of the 2017 Act,92 an individual is regarded as ‘threatened with homelessness’ 
 
89 See S. Fitzpatrick et al, ‘Crisis: Homelessness Monitor 2019’ (May 2019); available at: 
https://www.crisis.org.uk/media/240419/the_homelessness_monitor_england_2019.pdf 
90 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s3 inserting Housing Act 1996 s189A. 
91 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s4 substituting Housing Act 1996 s195. 
92 Which amends the definition in s175 Housing Act 1996. 
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if they are likely to become homeless with 56 days or a valid eviction notice under s21 of the 
Housing Act 1988 has been served to bring a private sector tenancy to an end and the expiry 
of that notice is within 56 days.93 The significance of this provision is that loss of a private 
sector tenancy remains the greatest single cause of homelessness in England. This extended 
definition of ‘threatened homelessness’ can thus be interpreted as a direct response to the 
empirical evidence on the causes and deleterious effects of homelessness. As regards the new 
prevention duty, this applies to those applicants who are eligible and threatened with 
homelessness irrespective of whether the applicant is intentionally homeless or in ‘priority 
need.’ For neither the expanded definition of threatened homelessness nor the new 
prevention duty can need be located as a central motivation of these provisions. Rather, the 
driving impulse is to identify at the earliest opportunity those at risk of homelessness, to 
intervene to assess those risks and to adopt risk-avoidance strategies and wider measures to 
evade or mitigate the probability of those risks materialising. 
 
A final yet crucial aspect of the 2017 Act that warrants attention are the new sanctions 
provisions introduced. These sanctions apply where there is evidence of a homeless 
applicant’s ‘deliberate and unreasonable refusal to co-operate’ with the local authority in its 
attempts to comply with the prevention and relief duties. Section 7 of the Act94 provides that 
if, in the view of the local authority, there has been a deliberate and unreasonable failure to 
co-operate, including failure to follow any of the agreed ‘reasonable steps’ contained in a 
 
93 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, s1 inserting new Housing Act 1996 s175(5). 
94 Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 s7 inserts new  Housing Act 1996 ss193A, 193B and 193C. 
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personalised housing plan, the housing authority’s duties can be brought to an end.95 These 
punitive provisions are significant. Evidently, these sanctions do not respond to need and, in 
fact, will in most conceivable circumstances, actively work against any concept of need. 
Instead, this disciplinary, ‘tough love’96 provision is premised on notions of responsibilisation 
of the homeless and of advanced liberal notions of exhorting the homeless to conform to 
norms of acceptable behaviour which can be seen as set within wider considerations of social 
control and risk.97 Homeless applicants who display ‘risky’ behaviours (in a similar vein to the 
earlier discussion as to intentional homelessness), will fall foul of the failure to co-operate 
sanction and thereby will be excluded from the protections of the 2017 Act. Calls from 
housing charities98 for the sanction provisions to be circumscribed in the Code of Guidance 
and designated ‘an action of last resort’ to be used only in ‘an exceptional or extreme 
situation’ such as wilful or sustained refusal to co-operate, went unheeded. Indeed, in an 
 
95 The housing authority must serve a notice on the applicant explaining its decision and the 
right of applicants to request a review of the decision under Housing Act 1996 s202(1). 
96 Described as such by Bob Blackman MP who introduced the Private Members’ Bill: Public 
Bill Committee, 6th Sitting col 141 18 January 2017. 
97 For a discussion of  the relationship between homelessness, responsibilisation and social 
control, see amongst others: J. Clarke, ‘New Labour’s citizens: Activated, empowered, 
responsibilised, abandoned? 25(4) Critical Social Policy, 25(4), 447; S. Johnsen, S. Fitzpatrick., 
B. Watts, ‘Homelessness and social control: a typology,’ (2018) 33(7) Housing Studies, 1106. 
98 See, for example, Shelter, ‘Consultation response: Department for Communities and Local 
Government consultation on Draft Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities’ 
Executive Summary 2017, 8. 
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earlier Draft Code of Guidance it was even suggested that ‘prioritis[ing] attending a Jobcentre 
or medical appointment, or fulfilling a caring responsibility,’99 would be an example of a 
homeless applicant’s failure of co-operation.100 
 
Just as with the 1996 legislation, again under the 2017 Act, the precise conception of risk 
engaged operates differently across distinct statutory measures of the legislation. In relation 
to the sanction provisions under s7, risk is deployed as a punitive means for excluding from 
homelessness entitlement those displaying objectionable or ‘risky’ behaviours. Risk here is 
again engaged (as so in the notion of intentional homelessness) negatively as a technique of 
‘category exclusion’ which locates and removes ‘risk groups’ from homelessness provision 
according to notions of non-cooperation and un-deservingness. 
 
Outside the sanctions provisions, however, the conception of risk engaged in the 2017 Act is 
positive in effect, protective and inclusionary; flowing from the essentially preventive motive 
at the heart of the legislation. Thus, as seen in relation to vulnerability under the 1996 Act, 
the conception of risk engaged in the 2017’s provisions reflects a ‘risk-embracing’ rather than 
a ‘risk-averse’ understanding of risk: from the broadened definition of ‘threatened with 
homelessness’, the initial homelessness assessment, the development of personalised 
housing plans to the prevention and relief duties. An individual assessed and categorised as 
being at risk of homelessness under the 2017 statute is offered support, the opportunity to 
 
99 Department of Communities & Local Communities, Draft Code of Guidance, October 2017, 
at [14.51(d)]; this was subsequently reversed in the final version of the Code. 
100 This form of words was removed from the final version of the Code. 
 32 
agree reasonable steps to minimise the likelihood of deprivation of housing and is owed 
housing duties by their local authority. A designation of risk, in this context, leads to greater 
entitlement, to protection and provision as opposed to exclusion from entitlement as under 
the sanction provisions or under aspects of the 1996 Act. In the next and final section, the 
article builds on this new reading of our current homeless legislation according to risk and 
offers a series of reflections on the implications of this risk reconceptualisation. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF A RECONCEPTUALISATION ACCORDING TO RISK 
 
If the risk reconceptualisation advanced in this article is to be persuasive, the case must be 
made as to why risk provides a fruitful and novel means of ‘seeing’ and reading homelessness 
law. Put simply, what does a re-reading of homelessness legislation according to risk offer? 
The previous section explored the ways in which risk is operationalised in the Housing Act 
1996 and the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017. This section consists of a series of 
implications that flow from this risk reconceptualisation. 
 
First, a reconceptualisation according to risk exhibits a stronger explanatory power of current 
homelessness legislation than the concept of need. As this article has shown, risk offers an 
instructive framework for exploring and explaining how the provisions of the 1996 and 2017 
legislation operate in practice: both according to a negative and a positive conception. 
Engaging risk according to a negative conception elucidates, in particular, how the notion of 
intentional homelessness; the definition by local authorities of excluded, categories of ‘non-
qualifying’ applicants in allocation schemes; and the non-co-operation sanctions of the 2017 
Act function. A risk analysis illustrates how risk is routinised in local authority decision-making 
 33 
on homelessness and, further, demonstrates the trend towards greater exclusions of 
applicants from housing provision. A risk framework therefore illuminates how local 
authorities make decisions about who is to receive housing support. These techniques of 
government cannot be explained by the concept of need. Were housing supply to exceed 
housing demand, need might be said to feasibly play a larger role, however, in the present 
context of severe housing under-supply, risk better describes these gatekeeping provisions 
which serve to exclude and filter out applicants from provision. Equally, locating risk in its 
positive, risk-embracing conception delivers a more convincing exposition of the test of 
‘vulnerability’ under s189 of the 1996 Act and a more coherent account of the internal 
motivations of the 2017 Act with its focus on predicting and preventing homelessness than 
does the concept need. It is here that the inherent probabilistic quality of risk is especially 
productive. While it may be argued that a vulnerable applicant is, in one sense, ‘in need’, a 
re-reading of the law according to risk captures more faithfully the precise legal exercise 
undertaken by the courts and local authorities when determining vulnerability; namely, the 
balancing of risks and predicted future harms. 
 
Secondly, and relatedly, it is argued that risk renders visible, in a way that need cannot, the 
essential logic and contested nature of homeless legislation itself. Risk reveals in sharper 
focus the difficult balance the law (and local authorities) must strike between the rationing of 
scarce housing and the management of constrained local authority resources whilst, at the 
same time, ensuring effective provision to those at greatest risk of harm from housing 
deprivation. The concept of need, whilst explicit on the face of the legislation and undeniably 
present in policy discourse, does not render visible this legal contestation as profoundly due 
to the definitional indeterminacy, political expediency and malleability of need which actively 
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obscure the true conflicts that exist in homelessness provision. Put differently, a risk analysis 
demonstrates how risk considerations operate both internally within local authorities, for 
example as to decision-making, and externally as to the management and husbandry of 
housing stock and, additionally, in the homelessness legislation itself that serves as the 
scaffolding of local authorities’ organizational structures and delimits the duties they owe to 
the homeless. This fundamental fracture and disconnect between housing the most 
vulnerable whilst vindicating local authorities’ legitimate desire to protect themselves from 
risks to their budgets and housing stock are aptly captured by the ordering theme of risk. 
 
Thirdly, an examination of homeless legislation through a risk lens provides insights into how 
the homeless are represented, governed and how images of the homeless are constructed 
and promulgated in homelessness law - situated within the broader literature on social 
control and advanced liberalism.101 The reconceptualisation advanced in this article is 
instructive in revealing how programmes and ‘technologies’ of risk are used as ‘modes of 
power,’ as methods of social control and how the homeless are represented in statute and 
policy discourse. The relationship between social control, advanced liberalism and 
homelessness is seen most pertinently in the identified negative conception of risk which 
emphasises the identification of ‘risk factors,’ the creation of ‘risk groups’ and, which employs 
 
101 See Johnsen et al, n 97 above; on social control in social services; generally see H. Dean, 
Social Security and Social Control (London: Routledge, 1991); M. Harrison., T. Sanders, (Eds) 
Social Policies and Social Control: New Perspectives on the ‘not-so-big Society’ (Bristol: Policy 
Press, 1996); R. Jones., J. Pykett, J., M. Whitehead, Changing Behaviours: On the Rise of the 
Psychological State (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013). 
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risk as a technique of category exclusion. Johnsen et al have identified the growing incidence 
of social control mechanisms in housing services where providers are adopting ‘softer’ forms 
of social control such as bargaining and influencing in order to mould and otherwise bring 
about behavioural change. It is here that a risk reconceptualisation can offer unique insights 
and contribution to the study of such subtler forms of social control. Various ‘modes of power’ 
are employed as mechanisms of social control to secure behavioural change ranging from 
threatening sanction to ‘influencing’ applicants to secure compliance with behavioural norms 
via persuasion or bargaining.102 Clear examples of these modes of power deployed within 
current homelessness legislation range from more robust and explicit examples of ‘coercion’ 
which seek to secure desirable behaviour by employing the threat of ‘deprivation’103 (for 
example, the threat of removal of support in the event of failure to co-operate under the 
sanction provisions of the HRA 2017) to subtler forms of ‘bargaining’104 (for example, the 
development of personalised plans and ‘reasonable steps’ to which both the authority and 
homeless applicant must agree and with which they must both comply if the applicant is to 
receive ongoing support). The notion of unintentional homelessness and allocation schemes’ 
qualification and non-qualification criteria can also be construed as ‘coercive’ in so far as they 
signal to applicants the standards and norms of behaviour required if housing support is to 
be offered.  
 
102 Johnsen et al, n97 above, at 1109. 
103 For discussion of ‘coercion’ see generally S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
104 For discussion of ‘bargaining’ see generally R. Grant, ‘Ethics and incentives: A political 
approach’ (2006) 100(1) American Political Science Review 29. 
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What can be observed is the use of a combination of ‘modes of power’ and social control 
techniques which oscillate between mechanisms which are coercive, bargaining, ‘disciplinary’ 
and therapeutic. As Johnsen et al note, ‘the deployment of … modes of social control … 
raise[s] moral and practical dilemmas, the nuance of which is often unacknowledged in 
current academic accounts.’105 These modes of social control within homelessness legislation 
are exposed through a risk-based analysis and are deeply controversial. Rose,106 in his work 
on post-Foucauldian governmentality, traces how government has shifted from rule through 
‘society’ to rule instead through an emphasis on citizens as self-autonomised, active 
individuals exhorted to self-improvement. This individualised conception of citizenship, 
centred on individual responsibility has been accompanied by a growing concern and focus 
on risk. Understood as risk-based systems, under the 1996 and 2017 Acts, we see that the 
homeless must satisfy qualifying criteria to ensure housing allocation; must conform with 
behavioural norms to avoid ‘risky’ behaviours and the label of intentional homelessness or 
non-co-operation; partake in risk assessment; be subjected to continued risk audit and to 
agree to compliance with mandated steps in personalised housing plans. If not, homeless 
applicants risk exclusion from local authority protection and support. The homeless are 
represented, constructed and governed as ‘risk populations’ that, through the modes of 
power outlined, are provided with the means, as autonomised, advanced liberal citizens to 
 
105 Johnsen et al, n97 above, at 1120. 
106 N. Rose, ‘Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism’ 22(3) Economy 
and Society, 283–299. 
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strive for self-fulfilment, respectability and ethical completion107 through a process of, what 
might be termed here, ‘de-risking’ or risk-removal. 
 
Fourthly, a risk reconceptualisation serves as a powerful catalyst for prompting as well as 
nourishing wider debates around reform to homelessness law. Set against a backdrop of rising 
homelessness, the Covid-19 pandemic, increasing public and media attention to the issue of 
housing deprivation and the well-documented accounts of ‘housing crisis,’ a risk lens and the 
distinction that it uncovers between negative, risk-averse provisions and positive, 
inclusionary, risk-embracing provisions can, meaningfully, incite further academic and policy 
work on the precise shape and nature of homelessness law and how it can be made more 
effective at reducing homelessness. The long-standing promulgation by government of need 
as the ordering theme of our homelessness law (despite being challenged in housing 
scholarship) has, on one view, concealed and impeded a seizing of the central issues of 
homelessness; namely, a lack of supply of affordable housing and the necessity to better 
understand and respond to the complexities of the homeless experience. By casting a new 
light on how homelessness decisions and entitlement are presently determined, a risk lens 
allows us to consider how homelessness legislation might be framed differently and more 
effectively in the future. A risk analysis has the potential to unlock possibilities for legislating 
according to a positive, risk-embracing conception of risk for more empathetic, preventive 
and responsive measures to homelessness. Put differently, risk offers a novel means of 
 
107 See discussion of self-improvement in the human geography context: S. Rutherford, ‘Green 
governmentality: insights and opportunities in the study of nature’s rule,’ (2007) 31(3) 
Progress in Human Geography 31(3) 291. 
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reading the law and ‘seeing’ homeless individuals not as a ‘risk’ or threat to be excluded or 
minimised but by embracing and acknowledging the inherent risks that contemporary life 
presents to all citizens. 
 
It has been argued that risk is deployed as a technique of ‘entitlement categorisation’ and 
both the 1996 and 2017 legislation can be re-conceptualised as risk-based, audit and 
management systems. Castel’s work engaging a risk framework in the field of psychiatry 
demonstrates how a negative risk system can be de-humanising; stripping away subjectivities 
and identity. However, by locating and exposing the different conceptions of risk engaged in 
current homelessness law, an opportunity to reshape future homelessness law according to 
an inclusionary, risk-embracing construction and rejecting the reductionist, exclusionary 
conception is presented. The prevention and relief duties of the 2017 Act and the 
‘vulnerability’ assessment under the 1996 Act demonstrate that a more person-centred, 
dynamic homelessness law is possible. Reform that enlarges this inclusionary,  non-
judgmental balancing of risks and harms could produce better homelessness presentation 
outcomes and eschew repetition of the homelessness cycle. There is a plethora of literature 
exploring the so-called homelessness ‘revolving door’108 and cycle of homelessness that 
current legislation fosters whereby the homeless are supported into housing only to lose that 
 
108 On which see generally C. Bevan, ‘The Hollow Housing Law Revolution’ (2014) 77(6) MLR, 
964; See E. Orme, ‘Localism: keeping it local…again…and again…and again…or not?’ (2012) 15 
Journal of Housing Law 72; V. Busch-Geertsema., S. Fitzpatrick, ‘Effective homelessness 
prevention? Explaining reductions in homelessness in Germany and England’ (2008) 2 
European Journal of Homelessness 69. 
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accommodation and find themselves once against applying to a local authority for further 
assistance. A reconceptualisation according to risk will allow more effective prediction of who 
is likely to be susceptible to this ‘revolving door’ and channel those most at risk people into 
more appropriate services suited to their particular vulnerabilities.109 This also lends weight 
to the argument to abandon, repeal or reform the punitive provisions around intentional 
homelessness in the 1996 Act and non-co-operation under the 2017 Act.110 In addition, 
adopting a risk analytical framework adds support to those calling for the development of 
new and radical approaches to housing allocations schemes, such as Fitzpatrick and 
Stephens,111 who have advocated for reform to the current, piecemeal allocations approach 
under which each local authority area adopts its own, bespoke scheme in favour of a unified, 
‘national allocation framework’ under a ‘revised principle of allocation according to long-term 
[housing] deprivation’112 to take the place of the present system which produces a postcode 
 
109 See S. Fitzpatrick et al, ‘Crisis: Homelessness Monitor 2019’ (May 2019); available at: 
https://www.crisis.org.uk/media/240419/the_homelessness_monitor_england_2019.pdf; 
see also Shelter Online Press Release, ‘320,000 people in Britain are now homeless, as 
numbers keep rising’ (November 2018). 
110 In Scotland, the Homelessness etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 abolished the categories of priority 
need; see W. Wilson., C. Barton, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper No. 7201, 
‘Comparison of homelessness duties in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland’ (April 
2018) 
111 S. Fitzpatrick., M. Stephens, ‘Homelessness, Need and Desert in the Allocation of Council 
Housing’ (2010) 14(4) Housing Studies 413. 
112 ibid at 429-30. 
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lottery of allocation across the country. While risk, as a principle of selection, can be seen to 
bring about both positive and negative results, in its positive conception, risk can serve a 
progressive and inclusionary role and a reform agenda built around embracing rather than 
averting the inherent riskiness of the human experience could meaningfully be pursued. 
 
Fifthly, and finally, adopting a risk reconceptualisation does not involve a denial of the history, 
role and evident potency of the language of need which has long been promoted as the 
driving force behind homelessness law. Rather, risk can be deployed, and its useful insights 
gleaned, without jettisoning need. Risk, in this way, provides an alternative means of  





The concept of need has long been promoted by government as the ordering theme of 
homelessness law in England. This article has problematised this concept of need and exposed 
it as definitionally imprecise, inconstant and conceptually empty. Building on existing 
literature both within and without housing scholarship, this article has argued for a renewed, 
reconceptualisation of homelessness law according to an alternative, ordering rationale not 
of need but of risk. This article has located the operationalisation of risk in the provisions of 
the Housing Act 1996 and the recently-enacted Homelessness Reduction Act 2017. Risk as an 
analytical frame has been advanced not to obliterate the ideology of need nor to suggest that 
need is entirely redundant in the theorising of housing law but rather as a novel way of seeing 
and reading existing homelessness legislation. In so doing, this article has contended that risk 
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can be observed as operating according to two, distinct conceptions: first, an exclusionary, 
risk-averse conception which seeks to gate-keep, ration scare resources and bring about 
behavioural change in homeless applicants and, secondly, an inclusionary, risk-embracing 
conception which adopts a more predictive, preventive, holistic approach. It has been argued 
that engaging a risk framework exhibits a stronger explanatory power of existing 
homelessness legislation local authority decision-making than the concept of need and, 
moreover, serves as a catalyst for informing and shaping future reform in this area. 
